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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0090

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0055

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: TREATMENT OF DEFINITION OF GROUND

FORCES -- ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES

I. BEGIN SUMMARY:

1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE BACKGROUND
CONSIDERATIONS AND CALCULATIONS UNDERLYING OUR TACTICAL
RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN MBFR VIENNA 0054.
END SUMMARY.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

2. ON THE NATO SIDE, APPROXIMATELY 29,000
PERSONNEL IN GROUND-SYSTEM AIR DEFENSE UNITS WEAR AIR
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FORCE UNIFORMS AND HAVE THEREFORE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM

THE NATO ARMY TOTALS OF 798,000 (IF 7,000 DUTCH SHORT-LEAVE PERSONNEL ARE INCLUDED). THE SAME IS TRUE ON THE PACT SIDE FOR ABOUT 11,000 GDR PERSONNEL.

3. ON THE PACT SIDE, SOME 42,000 MEN IN GROUND-SYSTEM AIR DEFENSE UNITS OF THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS HAVE BEEN COUNTED AS GROUND FORCE BY VIRTUE OF UNIFORM. THESE NATIONAL AIRDEFENSE COMMANDS ARE ORGANIZATIONS COMPLETELY APART FROM ANY PACT GROUND ARMIES OR ARMY GROUPS, ALL OF WHICH HAVE THEIR OWN ORGANIC AIR DEFENSE UNITS.

4. THERE ARE TWO OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL DISPARITIES THAT INVOLVE SMALLER NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL THAN THE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE DISPARITY. THE EAST HAS STATED THAT FRG AIR FORCE TROOPS MANNING SSM'S (3,700 IN PERSHING UNITS) SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCE COUNT, AND THAT PACT HELICOPTER UNITS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ARE "ARMY AVIATION" AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED GROUND FORCES.

III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

5. IN PREPARING TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, AND BEARING IN MIND THE EAST'S COMMENTS, WE HAVE EXAMINED ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF MODIFYING THE PRESENT ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WHICH IS TO CATEGORIZE SOLELY BY UNIFORMED SERVICES. THESE ALTERNATIVES ARE SET FORTH BELOW.

6. EVEN IF THEY DECIDE TO MAKE NO ADJUSTMENTS TO THE PRESENT UNIFORMED-SERVICE CRITERION, THE ALLIES ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL HAVE TO INCLUDE SOME PORTION OF THE PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL IN THEIR GROUND FORCE TOTAL FOR THE PACT. ALLIED HELICOPTER PERSONNEL -- BY OUR OWN DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA -- ARE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION BASE. IT WOULD NOT

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SEEM REASONABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO REFUSE TO INCLUDE PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WHEN THE EASTERN SPOKESMEN STATE THAT THEY ARE GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE, WE HAVE IN EACH ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERED INCLUDED IN GROUND FORCES THE 11,000 PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WHO ARE ESTIMATED TO SUPPORT GROUND FORCES.

7. INSOFAR AS FRG PERSHING UNITS ARE CONCERNED,

THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IS SMALL. IF THEY WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TOTALS FOR NATO GROUND FORCES IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE COUNTED ONLY AS TROOPS, WITHOUT ANY RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR NUCLEAR ROLE.

8. THE MAIN PROBLEM LIES IN FINDING A SYSTEM FOR DEALING WITH THE DIVERSE WAYS IN WHICH THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES HAVE ORGANIZED THEIR AIR DEFENSES. AS A FIRST STEP, AND TO INSURE THAT THE ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERED WILL RESULT IN AT LEAST ROUGH COMPARABILITY, WE HAVE DIVIDED THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES INTO THE FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES SET FORTH BELOW. THE THREE ALTERNATIVES WE SET FORTH MAINLY INVOLVE DIFFERENT WAYS OF TREATING THE ELEMENTS OF THESE AIR DEFENSE CATEGORIES.

9. TWO OF THESE ALTERNATIVES EXCLUDE THE LARGEST DISPUTED COMPONENT -- GROUND PERSONNEL BELONGING TO POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS -- FROM THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL. THEIR EXCLUSION WOULD DIMINISH TO A LIMITED EXTENT THE OVERALL DISPARITY BETWEEN PACT AND NATO GROUND FORCES AND CUT THE NUMBER OF FORCES THE ALLIES ARE CALLING ON THE EAST TO REDUCE TO REACH THE ILLUSTRATIVE 700,000-MAN COMMON CEILING. THIS APPROACH WOULD PRESUMABLY MAKE THE COMMON CEILING AND THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES SOMEWHAT LESS UNATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS APPROACH WOULD MEAN THAT THE AMBITIOUS ALLIED GOAL OF WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND PHASE WOULD BE FEWER THAN THE 157,000 THAT THEY WOULD AMOUNT TO USING THE FIGURES ALREADY ADVANCED TO THE EAST. BUT THE EXCLUSIONS WOULD BE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL UNLIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN WARSAW PACT

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OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND THE EFFECT OF EXCLUSION THEN WOULD BE TO FOCUS REMAINING WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0055

FROM US REP MBFR

ON MORE THREATENING PACT COMBAT FORCES.

IV. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

10. IN CONSTRUCTING THE ALTERNATIVES, DATA WERE DRAWN FROM ANNEX B TO MBFR WG DATA PACKAGE WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. WHEN US DATA ARE USED, WE HAVE SO INDICATED WITH AN ASTERISK.

11. FOR COMPARISON PURPOSE, THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS DIFFERENCES ARE COMPUTED USING THE FOLLOWING DATA POINTS AND DERIVATIVES THEREFROM:

TOTALS	FIGURES GIVEN TO EAST	REVISED ESTIMATES
PACT	925,000	950,000 ASTERISK
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NATO	777,000	791,000
DIFFERENCE	148,000	159,000
REDUCTION REQUIRED TO REACH ILLUSTRATIVE 700,000 COMMON CEILING		
PACT	225,000	250,000
NATO	77,000	91,000

RATIO OF REDUCTION

PACT/NATO	2.9/1	2.7/1
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THE REVISED FIGURES FOR THE WARSAW PACT ARE NECESSARILY TENTATIVE. TO GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF OUR PROPOSED INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS, HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE OUR CALCULATIONS USING THE LATEST REVISED NUMBERS AVAILABLE TO THE US DELEGATION. FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATION, WE HAVE ALSO EXCLUDED 7,000 NETHERLANDS SHORT LEAVE PERSONNEL FROM THE REVISED NATO TOTALS PENDING NATO RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

12. FOR EACH CASE, WE HAVE COMPARED THE CHANGE IN FORCE DISPARITY, AND THE REDUCTION REQUIRED FOR 700,000-MAN COMMON CEILING

A. TO SAME DERIVATIVES FROM DATA ALREADY TABLED, THUS SHOWING HOW THE CHANGES WOULD APPEAR TO THE EAST, AND

B. TO DERIVATIVES THAT WOULD COME FROM THE REVISED ESTIMATE OF NATO AND PACT MANPOWER, WERE NO ADJUSTMENTS MADE IN FORCE DEFINITIONS.

13. THIS MESSAGE FOCUCES ON EASTERN RATHER THAN ALLIED REDUCTIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT GIVEN INCREASES IN ALLIED GROUND FORCE TOTALS, THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMMON CEILING HIGHER THAN THE ILLUSTRATIVE 700,000 LEVEL IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED AT NATO AND IN VARIOUS CAPITALS, AND THAT RAISING THE COMMON CEILING WOULD CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIPS WE HAVE DESCRIBED. FOR PURPOSES OF ANALYSIS WE HAVE STAYED WITH THE ILLUSTRATIVE 700,000 LEVEL IN OUR DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONAL ALTERNATIVES. RAISING THE COMMON CEILING SO AS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEW
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FIGURES WOULD NOT AFFECT THE EASTERN VIEW OF REDUCTION DISPARITIES, BUT WOULD MAKE THE COMMON CEILING MORE UNATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST BECAUSE THE RATIO OF PACT REDUCTIONS TO NATO REDUCTIONS BECOMES MORE UNFAVORABLE.

14. THE FOLLOWING CHART (USING 950,000 ASTERISK FOR PACT 791,000 FOR NATO) ILLUSTRATES THE WAY IN WHICH UPWARD MOVEMENTS IN COMMON CEILING RAPIDLY REACH A COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE POINT.

CEILING	NATO REDUCTIONS	PACT REDUCTIONS	RATIO
700,000	91,000	250,000	2.7/1
710,000	81,000	240,000	3/1
72,000	71,000	230,000	3.2/1

740,000 51,000 210,000 4.1/1

15. IF FORCE DATA ARE TO BE USEFUL FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND DEFINING TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT, AND ULTIMATELY TO PROVIDE A BASE FOR VERIFICATION AND MONITORING, THE COMBINATION OF FORCE ELEMENTS INTO MEASURABLE GROUPS SHOULD BE DONE ACCORDING TO REASONABLY WELL-UNDERSTOOD RULES AND STILL PROVIDE ROUGHT COMPARABILITY OF TYPES OF FORCES ADDRESSED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DATA COMBINATIONS CLEARLY SHOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING THE WESTERN POSITIONS.

16. THE MAIN APPROACH TAKEN SO FAR BY THE WEST -- CATEGORIZING BY UNIFORMED SERVICE -- FITS THESE CRITERIA UP TO A POINT. IT PROVIDES A BREAKOUT OF DATA INTO SIMPLE, IDENTIFIABLE BLOCKS, IT IS READILY APPLICABLE TO NATO FORCES, AND IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NATO POSITION OF CONCENTRATING ON THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES. THIS RULE APPLIES REASONABLY WELL TO THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE NGA. IT RUNS INTO COMPLICATIONS WHEN IT COMES TO DEALING WITH THE DIFFERING AIR DEFENSE STRUCTURES OF THE TWO SIDES, PARTICULARLY WITH THE PERSONNEL IN GROUND-SYSTEM AIR DEFENSE UNITS.

17. TO MATCH UP FUNCTIONALLY COMPARABLE ELEMENTS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT AIR DEFENSE GROUND FORCES, TWO MAJOR CATEGORIES OF AIR

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DEFENSE TROOPS HAVE BEEN DEFINED. BOTH CATEGORIES REFER ONLY TO TROOPS MANNING GROUND ELEMENTS OF AIR DEFENSE, SUCH AS WEAPONS, AND THE AIR DEFENSE RADAR SITES AND COMMAND, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL NETS SUPPORTING THESE WEAPONS. NEITHER CATEGORY REFERS TO AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT UNITS, NOR TO THE GROUND ELEMENTS SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT UNITS. NOR DO THESE CATEGORIES MAKE DISTINCTIONS BY COLOR OF UNIFORM, NATIONALITY, OR UNIT DESIGNATIONS OF AIR DEFENSE GROUND FORCES. RATHER THEY GROUP AIR DEFENSE GROUND FORCES SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF (1) THEIR ROLE, AND (2) THE TYPE OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM OF WHICH THEY ARE PART.

A. TROOP AIR DEFENSE GROUND FORCES. THE ROLE OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS IN THE FIRST FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY IS TO DEFEND GROUND FORMATIONS UNDER THE COMMAND OF A GROUND OR COMBINED SERVICES COMMANDER AGAINST ENEMY AIR ATTACK. TO FULFILL THIS ROLE, THESE AIR DEFENSE TROOPS ARE SUBORDINATED TO THAT COMMANDER, AT EITHER DIVISIONAL OR HIGHER ECHELON, ND ARE PART

OF HIS COMMAND'S AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. TROOP AIR
DEFENSE GROUND FORCES COULD DEFEND FIXED INSTALLATIONS
OR GEORGRAPHICAL AREAS, BUT WOULD BE DOING SO ONLY

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FROM US REP MBFR

INCIDENTALLY WITH RESPECT TO THEIR PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE OF TROOP AIR DEFENSE. THEY CAN BE
EITHER STATIONED IN, OR NATIONAL FORCES OF, THE
COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED.

B. AREA AIR DEFENSE FORCES (GROUND BASED). THE ROLE OF AIR
DEFENSE TROOPS IN THE SECOND FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY IS TO
DEFEND AN ASSIGNED AREA OF TERRITORY, OR A SPECIFIC MUNICIPALITY
OR INSTALLATION WITHIN THAT TERRITORY, AGAINST ENEMY
AIR ATTACK. TO FULFILL THIS ROLE, THESE AIR DEFENSE
TROOPS ARE LINKED INTO AND PART OF AN INTEGRATED
NATIONAL OR REGIONAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (E.G., NADGE)

OR COMMAND (E.G. PVOS). AIR DEFENSE TROOPS COULD PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE FOR TROOPS IN GROUND FORMATIONS, BUT WOULD BE DOING SO ONLY INCIDENTALLY TO THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OR AREA OR POINT AIR DEFENSE. THEY
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CAN BE EITHER STATIONED IN, OR NATIONAL FORCES OF, THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED.

V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

18. CASE 1 UNDER CASE 1, THE ALLIES WOULD PROPOSE SUBTRACTING THE 42,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL SERVING IN THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS FROM THE TOTAL OF PACT GROUND FORCES. THESE PERSONNEL, THOUGH BELONGING TO THE GROUND FORCES, PERFORM AREA AIR DEFENSE FUNCTIONS SIMILAR TO THE 11,000 GDR AND 29,000 NATO AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WHO ARE ALREADY EXCLUDED FROM THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL BECAUSE THEY WEAR AIR FORCE UNIFORMS. US AND SOVIET ELEMENTS OF THE AREA AIR DEFENSE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE COUNTED IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS; AT 12,000 (US) AND 13,000 ASTERISK SOVIET PERSONNEL THEY ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL IN NUMBER. WE WOULD ALSO ADD THE 11,000 ASTERISK PACT PERSONNEL WHO MAN GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER UNITS TO THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL, AND, AT A LATER POINT, AFTER GOVERNMENTS HAVE CONSIDERED THIS POSSIBILITY, THE 3,700 FRG PERSHING TOTAL TO ALLIED GROUND FORCES.

A. EFFECT ON TOTALS. THE NATO GROUND FORCE TOTAL WOULD INCREASE TO 795,000. THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL WOULD DECREASE TO 919,000 (950,000 ASTERISK PLUS 11,000 ASTERISK MINUS 42,000). THUS THE GAP BETWEEN THE NATO AND PACT TOTALS WOULD BE NARROWED TO 124,000. THIS WOULD BE 24,000 LESS THAN THE 148,000 GAP IN THE FIGURES THE ALLIES HAVE GIVEN TO THE EAST AND 35,000 LESS THAN THE 159,000 GAP IN THE REVISED WESTERN ESTIMATES.

B. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, CASE 1 HAS THE FOLLOWING IMPLICATIONS WHEN COMPARED TO TABLED ALLIED METHOD OF DEFINING GROUND FORCES.

(1) ADDS 3,700 FRG AIR FORCE PERSONNEL MANNING PERSHING UNITS (ROUNDED TO 4,000) TO NATO REDUCTION BASE, AND DECREASES PACT REDUCTION BASE BY 31,000 TROOPS.

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(2) BY EXCLUDING POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES, FOCUSES REQUIRED PACT REDUCTIONS MORE ON OFFENSIVELY ORIENTED FORCES.

(3) ALL PACT PERSONNEL EXCLUDED ARE IN CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS.

C. POLITICAL EVALUATION. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS IN THE VIENNA TALKS AS THEY NOW STAND, CASE 1 HAS THESE ADVANTAGES:

(1) AS IN THE CASE WITH THE OTHER TWO ALTERNATIVES AS WELL, A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OF THIS APPROACH IS THAT THIS DEMONSTRATION OF ALLIED FLEXIBILITY IN THE DATA FIELD MAY INDUCE THE EAST TO BEGIN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF DATA PROBLEMS -- A PRACTICAL NECESSITY FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY EVENT.

(2) IT COULD MAKE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT LESS DISTASTEFUL TO THE EAST; IN FACT, THE DISPARITY IN SIZE OF REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING WOULD BE REDUCED.

(3) BECAUSE FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL ARE A UNIQUE ANOMALY AMONG PACT AND NATO MISSILE PERSONNEL, THEIR EVENTUAL INCLUSION PROVIDES THE LEAST OPENING FOR INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL UNLIKE CASE 2 DESCRIBED LATER, IF THE ALLIES ADVANCE THIS POINT AT A LATER TIME.

(4) IT WOULD MEET EASTERN COMPLAINTS THAT ALLIES, BY INCLUDING POLISH AND CZECH AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND EXCLUDING SIMILAR NATO AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, HAVE SOUGHT TO BIAS TOTAL GROUND FORCE FIGURES AGAINST THE EAST.

(5) IT WOULD PROVIDE A PUBLICLY DEFENSIBLE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES.

(6) IT CHANGES NATO TOTAL GROUND FORCE FIGURES ONLY BY 4,000.

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19. CASE 2 UNDER CASE 2, WE WOULD OFFER TO EXCLUDE FROM THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS ALL AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES WHO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS IN AREA AIR DEFENSE. IN ADDITION TO THE STEPS DESCRIBED IN CASE 1, THIS WOULD INVOLVE

EXCLUDING 13,000 ASTERISK SOVIET AREA AIR DEFENSE GROUND TROOPS FROM
THE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL AND 14,000 NATO
AREA AIR DEFENSE GROUND TROOPS FROM THE NATO TOTAL.
TWLEVE THOUSAND OF THESE ARE US.

A. EFFECT ON TOTALS. THE NATO GROUND
FORCE TOTAL WOULD DECREASE BY 10,000 TO 781,000
(791,000 PLUS 4,000 FRG PERSHING ROUNDED MINUS 14,000).
THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL WOULD DECREASE BY 44,000

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0055

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TO 906,000 (950,000 PLUS 11,000 -ASTERISK, MINUS
55,000 ASTERISK). THUS THE GAP BETWEEN NATO AND PACT
TOTALS WOULD BE NARROWED TO 125,000. THIS IS 23,000 LESS THAN
THE GAP IN THE FIGURES WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE
EAST AND 34,000 LESS THAN THE GAP THAT RESULTS
USING THE REVISED ESTIMATE.

B. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, CASE 2 HAS THE FOLLOWING IMPLICATIONS WHEN COMPARED TO TABLED ALLIED METHOD OF DEFINING GROUND FORCES.

(1) DECREASES NATO REDUCTION BASE BY 10,000 PERSONNEL AND PACT REDUCTION BASE BY 44,000 PERSONNEL.

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(2) NATO REDUCTION BASE WOULD INCLUDE 4,000 FRG AIR FORCE PERSONNEL MANNING PERSHING UNITS.

(3) THIRTEEN THOUSAND (ASTERISK) SOVIET AND 12,000 (ASTERISK) US AND 2,000 ALLIED AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WHO ARE CLEARLY GROUND FORCE TROOPS WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE REDUCTION BASE AND FROM THE LIMITATIONS OF THE COMMON CEILING.

C. POLITICAL EVALUATION. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING TACTICS, CASE 2 HAS THESE ADVANTAGES:

(1) IT COULD HELP TO MAKE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT LESS UNATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST. BOTH THE SIZE OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION (OVER BOTH PHASES) AND THE DISPARITY IN SIZE OF REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR UNDER THE ALLIED APPROACH WOULD BE DIMINISHED.

(2) IT PROVIDES A LOGICAL, INTERNALLY CONSISTENT, WAY OF DEALING WITH THE ANOMALIES IDENTIFIED SO FAR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS: ALL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES ARE EXCLUDED V SSM AND HELICOPTER PERSONNEL, IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES ON BOTH SIDES ARE INCLUDED.

(3) IT THEREFORE PROVIDES A REASONABLE WAY OF MEETING EASTERN COMPLAINTS THAT INCLUDING CERTAIN PACT AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, AND EXCLUDING SOME NATO AIR DEFENSE AND SSM PERSONNEL, THE ALLIES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO BIAS THE DATA AGAINST THE EAST.

(4) ITS DISADVANTAGES ARE:

(A) IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE APPROACH THE ALLIES HAVE ADOPTED BECAUSE IT EXCLUDES BOTH NATO AND PACT PERSONNEL WEARING GROUND FORCE UNIFORMS.

(B) SPECIFICALLY, IT EXCLUDES 10,000 (ASTERISK) SOVIET PERSONNEL (13,000 (ASTERISK) USING THE

REVISED FIGURES) FROM THE TOTAL, AND CREATES A SPECIAL CATEGORY OF SOVIET PERSONNEL WHICH COULD CAUSE FUTURE DIFFICULTIES.

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(C) BY DEDUCTING US AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, IT WOULD MAKE REDUCTIONS FALL MORE HEAVILY ON US COMBAT PERSONNEL.

(D) TACTICALLY, IT IS LESS ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST AND DOES NOT ELICIT THE SAME DEGREE OF INTEREST IN EITHER DATA DISCUSSION OR THE COMMON CEILING. IT DOES NOT CONVEY TO THE EAST THE DESIRED IMPRESSION THAT THERE MAY BE POSSIBILITIES OF FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE COMMON CEILING IF EAST GOT DEEPER INTO THE SUBJECT.

(E) IT IS LESS DESIRABLE THAN CASE 1, WHICH HOLDS THE LINE BETTER ON EXCLUSION OF UNIFORMED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

20. CASE 3. THERE IS A THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO CASES 1 AND 2. INSTEAD OF SUBTRACTING SOME OR ALL OF AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL FROM THE TOTAL, WHILE ADDING FRG PERSHING AND PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL, ONE COULD ADOPT THE OPPOSITE APPROACH OF INCLUDING IN THE TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES ALL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES TWO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO WEAR AIR FORCE UNIFORMS. THUS ALL ANOMALOUS FORCE ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ADDING TO THE PRESENT GROUND FORCE TOTALS: 29,000 NATO AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN AIR FORCE UNIFORMS, INCLUDING ABOUT 20,000 FRG AIRMEN, AND 11,000 GDR AIR DEFENSE COMMAND PERSONNEL IN AIR FORCE UNIFORMS. IT WOULD ALSO INVOLVE ADDING THE 4,000 FRG AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO MAN PERSHING UNITS, AND THE 11,000 (ASTERISK) PACT PERSONNEL WHO MAN GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER UNITS TO THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL.

A. EFFECT ON TOTALS. THE NATO GROUND FORCE TOTAL WOULD RISE BY 33,000 TO 824,000. INCLUDING THE RECENT INCREASE IN SOVIET GROUND AIR DEFENSE, THE PACT GROUND FORCE TOTAL WOULD RISE BY 22,000 TO 972,000. THUS THE GAP BETWEEN

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THE REVISED NATO AND PACT TOTALS WOULD BE 148,000.
THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE GAP FROM FIGURES
GIVEN THE EAST, BUT THE GAP IS 11,000 LESS THAN
THE GAP IN THE REVISED FIGURES.

B. EVALUATION.

(1) THOUGH THERE IS A CERTAIN LOGIC
TO THIS APPROACH, IT WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FROM
THE VIEWPOINT OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING AIMS FOR THE
ALLIES TO ADVANCE IT AS A PROPOSED WAY OF DEALING
WITH THE ANOMALIES IN FORCE STRUCTURES. BY
INCLUDING A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL
IN THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, IT WOULD SERIOUSLY
BLUR THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES, PROVIDING THE EAST
WITH ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING ALL AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.
MOREOVER, ALLIED REDUCTIONS NEEDED TO REACH THE
700,000 COMMON CEILING GOAL WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED,
BY 47,000 OVER THE TABLED FIGURES, OR 33,000 OVER THE
REVISED FIGURES. FINALLY, FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF
VIEW, THIS APPROACH WOULD DO NOTHING TO MAKE THE
COMMON CEILING CONCEPT ITSELF ANY MORE ATTRACTIVE

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TO THE EAST, SINCE THE GAP BETWEEN THE NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCE TOTALS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE FIGURES GIVEN THE EAST.

(2) ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST MIGHT ON A CONCEPTUAL BASIS AT LEAST, PUT FORWARD THIS APPROACH AS AN ALTERNATIVE OF ITS OWN, SHOULD THE ALLIES SEEK TO OPEN A DISCUSSION ON EITHER CASE 1 OR CASE 2. FROM AN EASTERN POINT OF VIEW, THE ADVANTAGE OF DOING SO WOULD BE THAT, IF ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIES, IT COULD BE REPRESENTED AS A MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF INCLUDING ALL FORCES -- GROUND, AIR AND NUCLEAR -- IN THE REDUCTION BASE. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH PRESENT EASTERN INSISTENCE ON COUNTING PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL IN GROUND FORCES, AND INDEED WOULD BE A LOGICAL

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EXTENSION OF THAT POSITION.

(3) FOR THESE REASONS, THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO BE PREPARED TO ARGUE AGAINST CASE 3. A POSSIBLE LINE OF ATTACK MIGHT BE TO POINT OUT TO THE EAST THAT UNDER CASE 3, THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS (AS REDEFINED UNDER THIS APPROACH) WOULD REMAIN THE SAME.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

21. FOR REASONS CITED, THE REAL CHOICE FALLS BETWEEN CASE 1 AND CASE 2; CASE 3 CAN BE EXCLUDED. CASE 1 SUBTRACTS A PORTION OF AREA AIR DEFENSE GROUND PERSONNEL FROM TOTAL PACT GROUND FORCES, THE 42,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OF THE POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDS. CASE 2 SUBTRACTS THESE 42,000 AND IN ADDITION, 13,000 (ASTERISK) SOVIET AND 14,000 (ASTERISK) NATO AREA AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES WHO MAN GROUND SYSTEMS. BOTH CASES ADD TO THE TOTAL THE 11,000 PACT PERSONNEL WHO MAN GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER UNITS AND, AS A POSSIBLE LATER STEP, THE 4,000 FRG AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO MAN PERSHING UNITS.

22. BOTH CASES HAVE ROUGHLY THE SAME EFFECT
ON THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS
OF EACH SIDE IN THE AREA.

23. THE DISADVANTAGES OF CASE 2 AS COMPARED
WITH CASE 1 AREA THAT CASE 2 EXCLUDES FROM THE
REDUCTION BASE 12,000 (ASTERISK) US AND 13,000 (ASTERISK) SOVIET
PERSONNEL WHO CLEARLY ARE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL. MOREOVER,
IT WOULD REQUIRE BOTH SIDES TO AGREE ON WHICH SOVIET
AIR DEFENSE COMPONENT SHOULD BE COUNTED IN THE
GROUND FORCES AND WHICH COMPONENT IN THE AIR FORCES.
THIS DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM WOULD NOT ARISE UNDER CASE 1.

24. FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, CASE 1
WOULD HAVE GREATER NEGOTIATING IMPACT THAN CASE
2. OPTICALLY, THE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TOTAL UNDER
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CASE 1 ALL GO IN A DIRECTION WHICH THE EAST WOULD
REGARD AS FAVORABLE TO IT. 42,000 POLISH AND
CZECH AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL WOULD BE SUBTRACTED
FROM THE PACT TOTAL, WHILE 4,000 FRG PERSHING
PERSONNEL WOULD BE ADDED TO THE NATO TOTAL. THE
11,000 (ASTERISK) PACT HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE ADDED --
IN EFFECT, AT EASTERN REQUEST. THUS, CASE 1 IS
MORE LIKELY TO BE POSITIVELY RECEIVED BY THE EAST,
AND PROVIDES A MORE PROMISING OPENER FOR A DIALOGUE
ON DATA AND GROUND FORCE LEVELS SUPPORTING ALLIED
NEGOTIATING AIMS.

25. FOR THESE REASONS, WE CONCLUDED THAT
CASE 1 SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF THE ALLIED TACTICAL
APPROACH DESCRIBED IN REFTEL.RESOR

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